Is Virtual Reality "Evil"?

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/philosophy/2009/60/2009_60_67/_pdf/-char/ja

• The overall flow of the document presents various arguments that consider VR as incomplete, unreal, and bad, and then refutes them.

  • It then compares reality and VR.

• Discussion on the Experiential Machine

  • It is easy to imagine that someone who has fallen into a certain state in their actual life would choose this machine. Here, I deliberately described it as a “certain state” to avoid getting entangled in complex discussions about ethical theories of happiness. From a certain simplistic perspective on happiness, desiring to be connected to an experience machine is similar to seeking to escape reality by resorting to alcohol or drugs due to the inability to endure the pain of life. Regardless of how much subjective happiness one may feel while intoxicated or tripping, it is only an illusion. Happiness is not temporary subjective pleasure, but rather it is related to how one shapes their own life.

• Therefore, the theory of VR does not necessarily collapse with psychological hedonism.

  • I still haven’t fully grasped this, but it seems important.

• As a premise, it is logically impossible in the Brain in a Vat scenario to cognitively recognize oneself as “a brain in a vat.”

• Therefore, when a perfect Brain in a Vat is realized, there is no longer a need to wonder if one is a brain in a vat.

  • Therefore, the claim that the life of a brain in a vat is empty is irrational.

• This discussion is specifically about immersing oneself in a “different reality,” so a similar logical structure cannot be applied in a pluralistic reality. (blu3mo)

  • Well, it can still be applied. (blu3mo)

• It seems that a similar logic does not hold when one is cognizant of being immersed in a reality different from classical reality. (blu3mo)

This document supports this claim, but I would like to discuss a little more about the fact that most of the arguments that relativize the difference between R and VR rely on the idea that the accuracy of VR can be increased infinitely.

• Oh, I see. (blu3mo)(blu3mo)

This is because many proponents of “the body” in contemporary philosophy often criticize what is known as “computationalism,” which is often cited as a target of criticism. How to think about this may become a matter of life or death for VR theories that assume the existence of computers. (blu3mo)

• However, even if we consider the brain’s functions as a complete black box, we can still create impressive VR experiences, so the downfall of computationalism does not necessarily indicate the limitations of VR.

VR as an artifact and its limitations

• In the end, virtual reality, like physical reality, is based on artificial objects that exist in physical reality.

  • And it is bound by the technical constraints of computers (bugs, lag, processing speed, etc.).
  • Well, if we see it as such, it becomes imperfect but not unnatural.Now, in the previous discussion, we examined the concept of “deterioration” in VR worlds as artifacts created within the R world, and generally supported the argument that compares the differences between the two on a fundamental level. However, the deterioration that was discussed there can be described as “factual (theoretical) deterioration.” In fact, it seems that almost all discussions of deterioration in VR so far have been of this nature. However, it may be worth considering the concept of “value-based (practical) deterioration” in contrast to this. Both of these should be considered as separate issues for the time being.

• Oh, I’m most interested in the concept of “value-based deterioration” (blu3mo).

  • However, in many criticisms of VR, issues related to value are often discussed as if they were the theoretical essence. This may not be an unreasonable assumption, considering the frequent use of value terms such as the “richness” and “creativity” of the R world compared to the “poverty” and “emptiness” of the VR world.

  • No, that’s not the case (blu3mo)(blu3mo)(blu3mo)(blu3mo)(blu3mo).
  • Let’s talk about the portrayal of VR worlds as dystopias like in The Matrix.

    • Those portrayals are nothing more than value judgments imposed by the creators of the stories.

    • No, that’s not the case (blu3mo)(blu3mo).
  • The moral “goodness” of the designers of VR worlds can be subject to skepticism.
    • That’s true (blu3mo).

• Regarding multiverse reality,

  • Among the various diverse realities,

  • only the “everyday world” is given the privileged position of being the “supreme reality.”

  • It is necessary to pay attention to the origin of this privilege.

  • In my opinion,

  • this privilege is merely “ethical” and is based on nothing more than what Akihiko Kazue calls “habit.”

  • If that’s the case,

  • labeling VR as “evil” would be a kind of “conservative” expression.

    • Well, no, that’s not true (blu3mo)(blu3mo)(blu3mo).
      • Intuitively, I also thought the same, but I was expecting Schutz to provide more evidence… (blu3mo).
    • Well, maybe we should consider some other perspectives here (blu3mo).

• Conclusion

  • At this point, any conclusion that can be added in the remaining space will inevitably be trite. VR as an artifact does not necessarily have the potential to be “evil.” And as Leibniz also recognized, the current R world is not necessarily the “best” and even contains many “absurdities,” so there is always the possibility of “improvement.” This also implies that there is the possibility of “improvement” in VR as well.

    • Well, that’s true (blu3mo).
    • It’s a good point (blu3mo).

• Wait, wasn’t most of what they wanted to say in this essay not mentioned? (blu3mo)(blu3mo)

  • Let’s consider it as Rekimoto Trampoline… (blu3mo)
  • 62b9db4c79e1130000f2bf6d would be a good place to delve deeper (blu3mo)(blu3mo).
    • Actually, this paper serves as the basis for explaining that the focus is narrowed down to this point, so we can concentrate on it from here.

• The foundation of the ethics underlying this base is not well organized, so let’s think about it again tomorrow.